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On Iran, Trump Has Backed Himself—and Much of the World—Into a Corner

Stephen Zunes

U.S. efforts to force an end to the stalemate in the Strait of Hormuz by attempting to escort a few U.S.-flagged ships through the Iranian closure will not only fail to relieve the worsening global fuel crisis and disruption of supply chains, it risks a resumption of full-scale war. The Trump administration has rejected Iran’s suggestion for negotiating an end to the blockade followed by a resumption of talks on other outstanding issues, insisting that Iran first agree to eliminate its nuclear program.

In February 2019, I sat in the Iranian Foreign Ministry, along with a small delegation of American peace activists, with Javad Zarif, the U.S.-educated foreign minister. He described how the 2015 Iran nuclear deal was a result of many months of intense direct negotiations, during which he met with then-Secretary of State John Kerry no less than 50 times, going over the agreement line by line.

Indeed, the talks took nearly two years, and involved five other nations (the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China) as well as the support of the European Union and the United Nations, before finally reaching the agreement formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Those negotiations took the best efforts of scores of veteran diplomats, skilled mediators, and technical experts. The result was a deal which, in return for the lifting of sanctions, made it physically impossible for Iran to build even a single nuclear weapon and included a rigorous inspections regime to ensure Iran’s compliance.

During his first administration, Donald Trump famously tossed that deal, insisting he could negotiate a better one. And now, instead of mobilizing the human and material resources to negotiate a political agreement with staying power to end the war, Trump is insisting that his son-in-law Jared Kushner, his real estate buddy Steve Witkoff, and his novice vice president JD Vance — none of whom have significant diplomatic experience or technical expertise regarding nuclear issues — could simply fly into Pakistan and, after no more than a few days, force Iran to capitulate.

Indeed, it was Kushner and Witkoff’s lack of understanding of how nuclear enrichment and related issues work that prevented them from appreciating Iran’s major concessions in talks early this year. Such ignorance likely contributed to Witkoff’s misleading assessments regarding the progress in negotiations which may have prompted Trump’s decision to go to war.

Trump has continued claiming the JCPOA was a one-sided deal favoring Iran, when in fact it was just the opposite. Iran had agreed to strictly limit its nuclear program without any reciprocity from nuclear-armed states nearby — Israel, Pakistan, and India — even though all three have also been in violation of UN Security Council resolutions regarding their nuclear programs which, unlike Iran, have actually produced nuclear weapons. And none of the other nuclear powers, including the United States, were required to reduce their arsenals, either.

Despite this, Trump abrogated the agreement, stating it did not go far enough to force Iran to stop supporting its regional allies, eliminate its missiles, and make internal political reforms. This has always been a pipe dream, however. It is hard to imagine any country not defeated in war making such concessions unilaterally. Indeed, Witkoff made a whole series of absurd demands, including that Iran unilaterally give up its navy.

During the Cold War, in nuclear arms talks with the Soviet Union, despite the plethora of geopolitical issues dividing Washington and Moscow, even the extreme anti-communist Nixon and Reagan administrations recognized that nuclear arms needed to be addressed separately, both as a result of their singular importance and the fact that bringing up other issues would needlessly prolong the talks and likely make any agreement impossible.

In my 2019 meeting with Zarif in Tehran, he noted how he had to fight elements within the Iranian government who opposed the treaty. The JCPOA required Iran to destroy billions of dollars’ worth of nuclear facilities and material in return for the lifting of debilitating sanctions. These political factions argued that the United States could renege on the agreement and reimpose sanctions at any time. Zarif and other political reformists expended enormous political capital by insisting that Washington could be trusted.

Trump proved Zarif and his fellow reformers wrong.

The reimposition of sanctions was not just in regard to Iran’s own direct trade with the United States. The Trump administration insisted on imposing secondary sanctions on companies in any country that continued economic relations with Iran, forcing many to comply against their wishes. For example, the French conglomerate TotalEnergies decided to pull out of a major project in Iran rather than lose its larger investments in the United States.

In part as a reaction to the reimposition of sanctions and the seeming vindication of hardliners, Iranians elected conservative Ebrahim Raisi president in the lowest turnout since 1979, and the clerical military leadership hardened their own political positions against further diplomacy with the U.S. Up until that point, Iran had been strictly following the JCPOA limits on its nuclear program, despite the U.S. abrogation and the imposition of new sanctions. But with the international community no longer willing to honor its end of the deal with sanctions relief, Iran determined that it was no longer bound by restrictions to its nuclear program and began enriching uranium well beyond the 3.67 percent allowed by the agreement. It is believed that Iran is now up to 60 percent enrichment capability, far closer to the 90 percent necessary to build a nuclear weapon.

This further enrichment then led, with the support of European nations, to a resumption last year of the more comprehensive UN sanctions that had been lifted in 2015, worsening the economic situation still further. Those sanctions exacerbated the problems inherent in the Iranian state’s crony capitalism, corruption, and economic mismanagement to further strangle the Iranian economy.

While Trump certainly deserves most of the blame, the failure of European countries to more forcefully challenge U.S. duplicity or even ensure desperately needed humanitarian aid makes it into Iran has further weakened Iranian officials seeking greater openness to the West and increased the power of political factions that insist on turning inward and imposing their will on a restless population.

In periods when the West appeared more willing to engage in serious diplomacy and economic relations, more political space has opened within Iran for both reformers within the system and pro-democracy activists seeking to change the system. By contrast, punitive sanctions, war, and the threat of war have helped elevate more reactionary clerical leadership as well as enrich elites and bolster the control of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which has in many respects already turned Iran from simply a conservative theocracy into a brutal military dictatorship.

Trump does not appreciate the importance of real diplomacy, however. He is used to getting his way by making demands, issuing threats, and using whatever means of force are at his disposal, whether it be with business associates, regulators, women, or nations. He is under the false impression that Iran will blink first — that by denying Iran critically important revenue from its oil exports, it would effectively surrender. More likely, the Islamic Republic, which has dealt with major economic sanctions for much of its existence, is quite willing to let its economy suffer rather than submit in a war over its own existence. And the Iranian people are less likely to push for more democratic space in the domestic political sphere while they are struggling to survive day to day, and their nation is under constant threat of war.

While negotiating an interim agreement which would allow for at least a partial reopening the Strait of Hormuz and postponing nuclear talks until later seems like the logical course of action, Trump may see such a compromise as making him appear to be a loser since, despite all the human and financial costs of his war on Iran, it would at best be a return to the status quo ante. His dramatic reaction to comments by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz — traditionally one of the more hawkish European leaders in regard to Iran, publicly recognizing Washington’s lack of an exit strategy — illustrates how he has backed himself into a corner, and much of the world with him.

If the domestic and international pressure for a reopening of the strait gets to be too much, Trump might borrow from Henry Kissinger’s response to another negotiation impasse in December 1972: Despite progress in peace talks between the United States and North Vietnam, the U.S. launched a devastating 11-day bombing campaign over Christmas, dropping 20,000 tons of ordnance on North Vietnamese cities and killing more than 1,600 civilians. Four weeks later, a peace agreement was signed on essentially the same terms North Vietnam had offered before. The Nixon administration, however, contended that it was the bombing that led the North Vietnamese to agree to U.S. terms.

The Trump administration may use the escalating conflict over the strait as an excuse to launch a similar short-term intensive bombing campaign on Iran and, regardless of whether it leads to further Iranian concessions, essentially declare victory if the Strait of Hormuz reopens, even with tolls.

Whatever the outcome, the same kind of hubris out of Washington that led to the tragic wars in Vietnam and Iraq is manifesting itself with Iran today. This time, however, it is impacting the entire world.

[Stephen Zunes is a professor of politics and director of Middle Eastern studies at the University of San Francisco. Zunes is also the co-author, with Jacob Mundy, of Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution (Syracuse University Press, 2023). Courtesy: Truthout, a US nonprofit news organization dedicated to providing independent reporting and commentary on a diverse range of social justice issues. Its editor-in-chief is Negin Owliaei, an Iranian American journalist, editor, and researcher known for her work on inequality, labor, and social justice issues.]

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Epic Nonsense: Trump Shelves Project Freedom

Binoy Kampmark

The waxwork figures of the Pentagon recently glowed with excitement with the announcement that the US military would be finally called upon to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. With the ceasefire between Teheran and Washington barely holding, President Donald Trump, as far as his attention span would allow, gingerly put Operation Epic Fury to the side in favour of a new mission. The effort to protect and navigate stranded and blocked vessels with US armed might would be dubbed Project Freedom.

As with everything in this cerebrally cloudy and foolish conflict, descriptions and names are untethered to a discernible reality. Was Project Freedom separate from the blockade of Iran? Yes, said certain administration officials. Was it an annex to Operation Epic Fury? No one quite knew.

Some details were provided on May 5 by the US Secretary of War, Pete Hegseth, at a press briefing.

“To be clear [Project Freedom] is separate and distinct from Operation Epic Fury. Project Freedom is defensive in nature, focused in scope and temporary in duration, with one mission: protecting innocent commercial shipping from Iranian aggression.”

Iran had been “the clear aggressor” in the Strait, “harassing civilian vessels, threatening mariners from every nation indiscriminately and weaponizing a critical chokepoint for its own financial benefit, or at least trying to.”

No mention, naturally, on why Iran had resorted to such measures in the first place.

Much of Hegseth’s press address was a bleat, a complaint that the Iranians had simply not played by the rules, rules happily broken by the Trump administration and their Israeli allies when they felt necessary. Iran had attempted to “impose a tolling system”, using “a form of international extortion”. Project Freedom was the celebrated antidote. “Two US commercial ships, along with American destroyers, have already transited the strait, showing the lane is clear.”

The account untethered to reality followed on cue. Iran had been “embarrassed” by the successful transit of these two vessels.

“They say they control the strait. They do not. So, American ships led the way, commercial and military shouldering the initial risk from the front, as Americans always do. And right now, hundreds more ships from nations around the world are lining up to transit.”

With lavish immodesty, the Secretary noted that US Central Command (CENTCOM) had, along with partner nations, “been in active communication with hundreds of ships, shipping companies and insurers.” The US had provided a “direct gift” to the world in the form of “a powerful red, white and blue dome over the strait.”

With the counterfeit, grubby appeal of an advertiser’s pitch, Hegseth went on to declare Project Freedom “humanitarian” in nature.

“By breaking Iran’s illegal stranglehold, we’re protecting the lives and livelihoods of sailors from dozens of countries, securing global energy routes and preventing shortages that hit the world’s poorest people the hardest.”

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine was also on hand to explain that CENTCOM had “established an enhanced security area on the southern side of the strait that is now protected by US land, naval and air assets to help defeat further Iranian aggression against commercial shipping.” He noted that Iranian fast boats and attack drones had been defeated. And how could they not be, given the presence of “more than 100 fighters, attack aircraft and other manned and unmanned aircraft, synchronized by the 82nd Airborne Division” engaged in the air for 24 hours a day guarding “the enhanced security area and its approaches”.

With 24 hours, this elaborate, exaggerated, purplish vision of American deliverance from Iranian control to an anxious world had collapsed. On May 6, Trump announced that he would be halting Project Freedom. Another round of proposals had been placed on the carousel of confusing diplomacy that might negate the need to resume bombing under Operation Epic Fury. Claiming that Pakistan and other specified countries had wished so, and given “the fact that Great Progress has been made toward a Complete and Final Agreement with the Representatives of Iran”, the blockade would remain in place but “Project Freedom (The Movement of Ships through the Strait of Hormuz) will be paused for a short period of time to see whether or not the Agreement can be finalized and signed.”

Later that day, Trump posted another message.

“Assuming Iran agrees to give what has been agreed to, which is, perhaps, a big assumption,” he declared on Truth Social, “the already legendary Epic Fury will be at an end, and the highly effective Blockade will allow the Hormuz Strait to be OPEN TO ALL, including Iran.”

The inevitable, clownish threat followed:

“If they don’t agree, the bombing starts, and it will be, sadly, at a much higher level and intensity than it was before.”

The rapid demise of Project Freedom, more aborted than halted, had less to do with the emergence of a new desire to pursue negotiations so much as logistical inconvenience. The Gulf States, by and large, have not been impressed by the impulsive measure, given the potential resumption of hostilities. Tehran was always going to blunt US efforts to break the blockade of the Strait, a point demonstrated by attacks on the United Arab Emirates on May 4 that left an oil refinery in the eastern emirate of Fujairah ablaze and three Indian nationals wounded.

According to a report from NBC News, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was disgruntled enough by the American initiative in the Strait to inform Washington that it would deny the US military any use of the Prince Sultan Airbase to enforce the mission or permit US aircraft to use Saudi airspace to that end. This was despite a call taking place between Trump and the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

An unnamed Saudi source was cited as saying that Saudi Arabia was “very supportive of the diplomatic efforts” led by Pakistan in aiding Iran and the US terminate the conflict, while a US official put it in simple terms as to why Project Freedom could only dissipate in impotence:

“Because of geography, you need cooperation from regional partners to utilize their airspace along their borders.”

From the embers of the Trump administration’s latest bungle emerged a one-page memorandum of understanding Washington has reportedly drawn up for further discussions with Tehran. It reportedly contains 14 points, covering, for instance, a declaration ending the war and the commencement of a 30-day period of negotiations on a detailed agreement that would see Iran reopen the Strait over that duration. This would be complemented by the lifting of the US naval blockade. Restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program and the lifting of US sanctions also feature. Failing all that, the blockade or a resumption of military operations could take place. How chillingly close this is to those remarks of T. S. Eliot in the Four Quartets:

“What we call the beginning is often the end/And to make and end is to make a beginning. The end is where we start from.”

This war was a beginning, and an end, we never needed.

[Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He currently lectures at RMIT University. He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG). Courtesy: Global Research, the website of Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG), an independent research and media organization based in Montreal.]

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Two Models of Resistance Against the Blockade: The Pakistani Corridor for Iran and the Refining of Cuban Crude Oil

Nicolás Romero Reeves

The unilateral coercive measures imposed by the United States have ceased to be an exception and have become the norm in its foreign policy. However, far from subduing the targeted countries, these restrictions are accelerating the search for sovereign solutions and the reconfiguration of global trade routes. Two recent examples illustrate this clearly: on the one hand, Pakistan’s decision to open its ports to the transit of goods to Iran, circumventing the U.S. naval blockade; on the other, Cuba’s success in refining its own heavy crude oil using its own technology, breaking the taboo that domestic oil was unprocessable. Both cases show how external pressure stimulates geopolitical and energy innovation.

The Pakistan-Iran Corridor: A Bypass to U.S. Naval Dominance

The announcement from Islamabad, confirmed by the Tasnim news agency, authorizes the use of the ports of Gwadar, Karachi, and Qasim as logistics hubs for goods bound for Iran. The measure aims to offer a direct alternative to the port of Jebel Ali in the United Arab Emirates, on which Tehran has historically depended and whose reliability has been eroded by political instability and the tightening of sanctions.

This new corridor is not merely a bilateral agreement. It is part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), valued at $60 billion, and by extension, the Belt and Road Initiative. In practice, it turns Pakistani ports into a land-based extension of Iran’s southern ports, allowing for streamlined trade and reduced costs while circumventing the U.S. naval presence in the Persian Gulf. Washington’s reaction—which weeks ago announced a naval blockade against Iran—has been described by Tehran as an act of “maritime piracy” that could warrant a “practical and unprecedented” military response. But beyond the rhetoric, Pakistan’s move demonstrates that mechanisms of unipolar suffocation can be circumvented through emerging alliances and by leveraging Chinese infrastructure in Eurasia.

Cuba: Strengthening Sovereignty in the Face of the Energy Embargo

The second case is closer to home, but follows a similar logic. The intensification of the U.S. embargo under the Trump administration included a fierce crackdown on fuel supplies to the island, leading to a severe shortage of gasoline and diesel. Faced with this situation, the Center for Petroleum Research (Ceinpet), affiliated with Cuba Petróleo (Cupet), developed a thermoconversion technology that improves the properties of the country’s heavy and extra-heavy crude oil—from the northern region—by reducing its viscosity without the need to blend it with imported gasoline.

In April 2026, President Miguel Díaz-Canel announced that “a taboo” had been broken: for the first time, Cuban crude was refined at the Hermanos Díaz refinery in Santiago de Cuba, yielding gasoline as a solvent, marketable diesel, and fuel oil for thermoelectric plants and the nickel industry. The next step is to install a pilot plant at the Sergio Soto refinery in Sancti Spíritus to scale up the process. Additionally, work is underway on a second catalytic stage using Cuban laterites to reduce sulfur, utilizing the island’s natural resources.

What matters is not just the technical achievement, but its political significance: science and innovation—integrated into the Science- and Innovation-Based Government Management System—make it possible to replace imports, leverage domestic resources, and reduce vulnerability to a blockade intended to paralyze the energy sector. As Díaz-Canel noted, the solution had to be “sovereign,” and that is exactly what it has been.

Both Iran and Cuba face the same dynamic: a hegemonic power that uses control of the seas and energy flows to subdue states that do not align with its interests. But the response in both cases has not been submission, but rather the diversification of allies and the development of endogenous capabilities.

By integrating Iran into the CPEC, Pakistan strengthens the Asian axis that challenges the U.S.-dominated maritime order; by refining its own crude oil, Cuba demonstrates that suffocation can become an opportunity to unleash accumulated scientific potential. These are not definitive victories, but they are evidence that blockades, far from guaranteeing surrender, accelerate the technological and geopolitical emancipation of those under blockade.

On both fronts, the cost to Washington is twofold: it loses its ability to exert pressure while pushing its targets to build alternatives outside its sphere of influence. And in the process, the global landscape becomes more multipolar, more unpredictable, and—for those committed to sovereignty—more promising.

[Nicolás Romero Reeves is a Chilean lawyer, sociologist and political commentator who serves as the director of Revista De Frente. Courtesy: Revista De Frente, a Chilean progressive digital magazine. Translated and published in English by Internationalist 360°, an online platform that publishes articles and analyses on global geopolitical issues, social justice movements, and international relations.]