In the recent past, warrior men and women like Maharaja Suheldev from Uttar Pradesh, Maharani Ahilyabai Holkar from Maharashtra, Veeramangai Rani Velu Nachiyar from Tamil Nadu, Rani Abbakka from Karnataka, Rani Durgavati from Madhya Pradesh, Lachit Borphukan from Assam, the Travancore ruler Marthanda Varma from Kerala, and Veer Kunwar Singh from Bihar, among others, have been celebrated by various BJP-RSS affiliated fronts for fighting against Portuguese, Dutch, British, Mughal, and Afghan rulers in different parts of India. This is in addition to figures like Shivaji, Maharana Pratap, and Prithviraj Chauhan, who were already being celebrated by the BJP-RSS for their martial prowess. Do these celebrations have any precedence? Is there a conceptual lens, which can help us understand the sudden spurt in these celebrations? Do these celebrations have any socio-political relevance in contemporary India?

Historical precedence

A cursory glance at reality tells us that there are indeed socio-political groups associated with jatis. Communities like Nairs and Ezhavas in Kerala; Vainnyars and Thevars in Tamil Nadu; Gonds in Madhya Pradesh; Marathas in Maharashtra; Rajbanshi in West Bengal and Assam; Ahom in Assam; Kurmi/ Patels, Yadavs, Jats, Kayastha, Rajbhars, and Pasis in North Indian States, among others, who have periodically reiterated through the media (and social media in recent times) their claims of having performed Kshatriya varna functions as militia and elite landholders in various regimes in the past.

There is a historical precedence to these claims. Akhil Bharatiya Kshatriya Mahasabha was established in 1897, at the initiation of Rajput leader Raja Balwant Singh Ji Avagarj in coordination with Thakur Umrao Singh Ji. Simultaneously, many other claimants, whom Rajput organisations as well the then British government did not recognise as Kshatriya, formed similar organisations. The formation of organisations such as the Akhil Gomantak Kshatriya Maratha Samaj (1940), Ahir Yadav Kshatriya Mahasabha (1910), All India Kurmi Kshatriya Mahasabha (1894), Vanniyakula Kshatriya Mahasabha (1888), Dushashan Bansiya Kshatriya Mahasabha during this period is also well known. MSS Pandian (2013) and A R Venkatachalapathy (2010) note that during the same period in present-day Tamil Nadu, Nadars and Vanniyar were in a bitter struggle to claim Kshatriya status. Thevars (Mukkulathor) in Tamil Nadu also frequently claimed Kshatriya status in petitions to the British administration and during post-independence social mobilisation.

Socio-psychological explanation

Dr. B.R Ambedkar, in his seminal work ‘Castes in India’, invoking the work of economist Walter Bagehot, and sociologist and psychologist Jean Tarde’s laws of imitation, emphasised the role of “the infection of imitation” in the formation of many castes in India.

This is the bedrock on which sociologist M.N. Srinivas’s concept of Sanskritization (1952) seems to rest. Srinivas suggested that apart from Brahminical model of Sanskritization, there could be Kshatriya or Vaishya or Shudra model of Sankritization as well. In fact, S.K. Srivastava in 1963, found that in rural Agra both underprivileged castes and Brahmins, especially when they became a land-owning class and zamindars, were “kshatriyaising” themselves “in order to acquire the status of landlord rather than of the Brahmin priest”.

Hermann Kulke, an eminent German Indologist and historian, who worked extensively on Odisha’s rich history, died recently on March 10, 2026. His work focused on state formation, kingship, and religious legitimation in early medieval India. Kulke’s research has been particularly influential in the study of regional political structures in eastern India, especially Odisha. Kulke (1976), while recognising the Kshatriya model of Sanskritization, where other castes adopt Kshatriya rites and status symbols, distinguished it from Kshatriyaisation. According to Kulke, in a “functional sense”, Kshatriyaization could be called social change “from above” which was initiated in tribal areas by the Kshatriyas, i.e., zamindars, chiefs or rajas to strengthen their claims to legitimacy in the society and to broaden the basis of their economic and political power. He went on to show that in 17th and 18th century Odisha, regional rulers “encouraged Kshatriyaisation “from above” by granting special rights and status symbols to” tribal chiefs. This “transmission of Kshatriya values, rites and status symbols” from above were complementary to Sanskritization “from below”. He makes an important point that Kshatriyaisation “from above” whereby “the temples of the powerful tribal gods and goddesses regain their previous dominating positions” can be superficially seen as “a process of de-Sanskritization or even re-tribalisation”, which may not be actually so. Thus, Kshatriyaisation was not merely a social process but also a political strategy of legitimation, allowing rulers of diverse origins to become integrated into the hierarchical order of caste and kingship. He presented these examples as evidence of the fact that a “changing India need not necessarily be a modern India”.

Sociologist André Beteille (1991) also argues that modern caste hierarchy is shaped increasingly by power, class, and politics rather than ritual status alone. Similarly, French political scientist Christophe Jaffrelot (2003) shows that caste groups mobilise politically by constructing historical identities and claims to warrior or ruling status.

Contemporary socio-political relevance

The celebration of the Kshatriya identity by communities like Marathas, Jats, Yadavs, Thevars, and Nairs, actively promoted by the BJP-RSS, illustrates Kulke’s concept of “Kshatriyaisation”, where martial or landholding groups assert higher varna status to legitimise their social authority. Moreover, by linking historical warrior roles to contemporary Hindu nationalist narratives, these claims reinforce both caste pride and political allegiance, strengthening vote banks for the party. Significantly, this process demonstrates how the caste system persists and sustains. The ritual and historical hierarchies are continuously reinterpreted, codified, and mobilised to reproduce social stratification, even as communities seek upward mobility through Sanskritization or Kshatriyaisation. Thus, political appropriation of castes as historically warrior communities not only consolidates power but also perpetuates the structural inequalities entrenched in the caste framework. By linking historical warrior roles to Hindu nationalist narratives, these claims consolidate political support while reinforcing caste hierarchies. In summary, the RSS-BJP’s use of Kshatriyaisation is a strategic reinterpretation of history to transform passive Hindu identity into an active, assertive, and political “warrior” identity, which they use to claim socio-political legitimacy for their “Hindu Rashtra” project.

[Aparajay teaches economics at the Faculty of Arts & Social Studies, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata. Courtesy: The Hindu newspaper, an Indian English-language newspapers, founded in 1878 and published from Chennai, with a long reputation for serious reporting and editorial analysis.]