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The Idea of Ram, and the Idea of India

Purushottam Agrawal

The word “Ram” as an adjective means soothing and pleasing in Sanskrit. For millennia it has been so for millions in India and beyond, not in a frivolous, hedonistic way but in a sublime sense. As a proper noun, as the name of a person, it refers to the king of Ayodhya, who as the crown prince willingly suffered unjust banishment for 14 years as he chose to uphold the sanctity of the “word” given by his father, King Dashrath, in a moment of weakness to his youngest wife, Kaikeyi.

Ram is also the most popular name—courtesy of Bhakti poets such as Kabir—given to formless divinity, the ultimate consciousness permeating the whole of existence. Such poets insist that their Ram is different from Ram the king of Ayodhya but nonetheless continue to use adjectives such as Raghav and Raghunath that are drawn from the narratives of King Ram, the avatar of Vishnu.

Crown prince Ram could have chosen to ignore the manifestly unjust command issued by his father, who was going back on his own previous, publicly expressed wish to see his eldest son crowned but did not have the courage to stand up to his youngest and most beloved wife. Everyone in the palace and in the populace was shocked at the king’s sudden volte-face.

In Valmiki’s narrative, Ram’s devoted younger brother Lakshman was angry and wanted Ram to ignore the king’s order and insist on his claim to the throne, by force, if need be. This would not have brought any opprobrium, only widespread approval. After all, Ram was a victim of patent injustice, and in such situations, this was the road to the throne that many had taken before him and many would take after him. Or maybe, disenchanted by the palace intrigues, he could have taken the road to the forest to reflect on the philosophical puzzles of existence.

But Ram took “the road less travelled by/And that has made all the difference”.

‘Maryada Purushottam’

The difference showed throughout his life. The story of his life is deeply entrenched in the Indian cultural memory and psyche. As is well known, there are many Ramayanas, with numerous variations in the narrative, but in each one of them, Ram is the embodiment of right conduct. Ram is believed to be an avatar of Vishnu, but in Valmiki’s narration, he insists on being human at the most poignant moment. Having defeated Ravana, Ram declares: “I, the man, have overcome the ordeal ordained by fate.”

Fate had ordained for Ram “the man” extremely onerous inner conflicts too. In facing his ordeals and conflicts, the man never twisted and turned the codes and laws opportunistically for selfish reasons, never hankered after power, never put a gloss of dharma, faith, or tradition on baser personal ambitions—political or of other kinds. He came to be seen as a measure of moral conduct to such an extent that in moments of his own wavering he was reminded of his “Ramatva”, his Ram-ness. In Valmiki’s Ramayana, pained at Ram’s harsh words, Sita is astonished. “You are talking like an ordinary man,” she says. The gods assembled in the sky also remind him of his being Ram.

No wonder, such a man is revered as Maryada Purushottam, “the man personifying moral conduct”.

It is probably due to the moral content of the Ram of these narratives that the early modern Bhakti poets like Kabir and others desirous of directing their spiritual pursuit towards the formless, indivisible consciousness of existence chose the name Ram for their idea of the divine. Their idea of Ram did not sanction caste prejudices and ritualistic forms of devotion. But, years later, Tulsidas, through his powerful epic Ramcharitmanas, turned Ram into a metaphor of a utopian revival of a traditional, conservative (even if reformed) social order and mindset.

In any case, today we can and, in fact, must categorically reject many aspects of the ethical code that Ram is supposed to have so strictly followed. Even in the traditional canon, there are poetic and popular narratives which disapprove, both implicitly and explicitly, of some of Ram’s acts. The point, however, is that his personal integrity and commitment to maryada (standards of moral conduct) remain beyond the slightest doubt.

It is for those making Ram a mascot for a certain kind of politics to reflect what their acts do to the maryada of an inclusive, democratic republic and a compassionate, just society that India theoretically aspires to be.

Plurality and diversity of Hinduism

In spite of all his unique glory and stature, Ram is one of 10 or 24 avatars of Vishnu, one of the most important, of course, but still not the only one. Vishnu himself is a member of the divine triumvirate, the other two being Siva and Brahma. Herein lies the crux of the uniqueness of Hinduism as a religious tradition.

The inherent plurality and diversity of Hindu tradition literarily speaks in many voices. The Vedas—theoretically, the primary authority—are four and one of them (Atharva) was certainly added on later. Then we have the numerous Dharmashastras, the Puranas, and the epics, all of which can be cited as “authority”, while most of the time it is the customs of a locality or community that are seen as the measure of appropriate conduct.

The Hindu pantheon has innumerable figures from various ages and regions, with every local deity getting a place in the pantheon that goes on evolving by the day in number and variety. Durga or Kali are more popular than Ram in West Bengal; the favourite in Odisha is Jagannath; forms of Krishna and Siva are preferred in Gujarat, Maharashtra, and the southern States. Naturally, with such diversity, many conflicts also took place, but today, generally speaking, the devotees of one deity do not cancel out other deities. Unless, of course, some Ram bhakts find it amusing to tease the Chief Minister of West Bengal by using “Jai Shri Ram” as a political war cry or a Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) office-bearer deems it fit to implicitly ask the Shankaracharya to mind his own business as the Ram temple belongs to “Ramanandi Vaishnavas and not to Shaivas or Shaktas”.

The question of the timing and procedure of the pran pratishtha (consecration) in the still incomplete temple at Ayodhya has caused some controversy due to the discontent expressed by some of the Shankaracharyas. One of them, Swami Avimukteshwaranand, has been quite vocal and, hence, has been sharply targeted by commentators and trolls sympathetic to the RSS/BJP/VHP family.

The validity or invalidity of the objections raised by the Shankaracharyas is for the experts of rituals to decide, but the debate, along with other such instances, brings out in the open the core of the conflict between Hinduism as a religious tradition and the political ideology of Hindutva.

Incidentally, the scholar who was tasked with determining the muhurt, or auspicious time, has stated that he was “requested” to find a date before February 2024. This was obviously in order to milk religious faith and sentiment in time for the election in 2024.

Is it all right to act with such hurry, motivated by the love of power, in such a sacred matter? This question begs an answer not only from the point of view of an inclusive republic but also from a strictly religious and traditional point. In fact, more than everyday power politics, the very nature of Hindu tradition is at the stake here.

Plurality—the defining characteristic of the Hindu tradition—is underlined by the institution of the Shankaracharyas too, howsoever conservative their world views (or for that matter, even that of Adi Shankara himself) may be. None of the four seats established by Adi Shankara can claim precedence over the other. Plurality of voices remains the central feature of Hinduism, be it conservative or liberal; whether it is insistent on upholding the traditionalist ways of living or open to changes.

The Fuhrer Principle

Contrast this plurality with the RSS’ principle of organising social and political life—ekchalakanuvatitva, that is, “follow one leader”, which is clearly inspired by Hitler’s Führer Principle, which demanded unquestioning obedience to the leader. The RSS insists on being taken as “the sole spokesman” of Hinduism without caring for the fact that such fantasies can be realised only by doing great violence to the core of the Hindu tradition. This obsession with “one” is expressed in many contexts—from language to taxation. The trolling and other forms of persecution of dissenting voices (even if the voice belongs to a revered, traditional Hindu seer) is a natural expression of the increasing consolidation of the Führer Principle in our national life.

Ironically, it has now reached such heights that even L.K. Advani and Murli Manohar Joshi are not exactly welcome at the function culminating the campaign that was launched and led by them. Not only in the history of independent India, it seems that even in the history of the BJP, nothing worthwhile took place before the arrival of the one and only one.

“Some questions are so important that they are never asked” was the opening line of a lecture by Noam Chomsky that I had the opportunity to attend in 2020 at the University of Arizona, Tucson. How real this observation has become in our own society today. How long the list of “important questions not to be asked” is becoming. What is the space given in the media and dominant political discussion to questions like the chaos caused by demonetisation, the insensitive handling of the pandemic, the rising unemployment, the deliberate corrosion of the institutions of the state, the demonisation of intellectuals as a class, the systematic creation of a cacophony of “hurt sentiments” along with a violent, irrational, and, in fact, stupid mindset?

January 22 has been projected as Victory Day. It is, of course, a victory, not of the vibrant Hindu religious tradition but of a majoritarian, exclusionist project that is dead opposed to an inclusive, modern, and dynamic idea of India. The hurried consecration signifies not any vindication of Hinduism but its appropriation by a politics that thrives on deeply entrenched spiritual emptiness and insecurity.

False belief

The Babri Masjid/Ramjanmabhoomi dispute has simmered for quite some time, but the Hindutva campaign gained real momentum in the mid-1980s, when the right environment for it was created by the false belief of the then ruling Congress party that the idea of India born out of the freedom movement could now be taken for granted and that there was hardly any need for a politics of ideas. Hence, “development plus management sans political content” became the mantra of choice. The idea of Sarva Dharma Sambhava, a specifically Indian variant of secularism, was reduced to competitive appeasement of communal forces. Recall the ban on Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses and the intervention in the Shah Bano case on the one hand and the opening of the gates to a disputed structure on the other.

In the background were the deft strategic moves by the RSS (which, to its credit, has never discarded its idea of a Hindu nation) to win friends and influence influential people. Recall Jayaprakash Narayan issuing the best endorsement the RSS could hope for (“If the RSS is fascist, so am I”). Then, there was the astonishing inability to read and handle with care the rising “Hindu phenomenon” in its many aspects. The Hindu sense of hurt and insecurity (both real and imaginary) leading to a slow, subterranean making of the “angry Hindu” was completely ignored.

It was imagined in the wake of the demolition of the mosque in 1992 that Mandal had the power to take on Kamandal. For some time, it looked like it might, but we then had Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s BJP government with leading lights from OBC politics in ministerial positions, and just after the Gujarat riots of 2002, the iconic Bahujan leader Mayawati had no compunction campaigning for the BJP.

Challenge for democratic forces

There are many factors to the recent phenomenal success of the Hindutva project, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi has used them deftly, making himself the mascot of not only Hindutva but also of assertive Indian nationalism. With the enviably proactive support of large sections of the media, the BJP has sought to, and achieved, some success in presenting itself as the architect and defendant of the vision of a proud, strong, and assertive India. It has succeeded in projecting some terrible instances of policy failure and misgovernance as necessary sacrifices in the service of a shared national dream.

The challenge for democratic forces and citizens lies here. The march of Hindutva authoritarianism cannot be halted by sentiments (noble in themselves) like “love” and “justice” or by single-point programmes (important in themselves) such as the caste census. These and other ideas have to be put into the framework of a vision of India about which people feel deeply proud and for which they are willing to make sacrifices. Such a vision by definition has to be inclusive, holistic, and articulated in an inspiring idiom.

Will the opposition prove equal to the task? On that answer depends the future of the idea of a self-confident and yet inclusive and compassionate India.

(Purushottam Agrawal is a historian of literature who has been engaged with popular religiosity in northern India for over four decades. Courtesy: Frontline magazine.)

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PM Modi in Ram Temple Pran Prathishtha: End of Secularism as ‘Distance’ Between State and Religion?

Sravasti Dasgupta

In his speech in 1928 to the Indian Statutory Commission, Dr B.R. Ambedkar, the father of the Indian Constitution, described politics in India as “nothing but theology in action”.

“If representative government is so weak when operating among European peoples, where the secularisation of politics has gone far further, how much weaker must it be in India where politics is nothing but theology in action. It is this theology against which the depressed classes must seek to be protected,” he said.

If Ambedkar’s words on the politics in India being “theology in action” are to be believed, a manifestation of his statement will be visible on January 22, when Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the head of the sovereign, secular state in India, participates in the consecration ceremony of the Ram Temple in Ayodhya, just months ahead of the 2024 Lok Sabha elections.

The official sanction to the event at the under-construction Ayodhya Ram temple – built on the site where the Babri Masjid was destroyed by Hindutva groups, with over 2,000 people killed in the ensuing communal violence, over three decades ago – is in no uncertain terms being celebrated as a national one with state governments including central hospitals rolling out official notifications, orders and directions giving half or full day offs.

In 2013 essay, political theorist Rajeev Bhargava argued that secularism is not against religion, it opposes institutionalised religious domination. He wrote that the secular state shows “critical respect to all religious and philosophical world views, possible only when it adopts a policy of principled distance towards all of them”.

Does the January 22 event then represent an unprecedented moment in independent India where this “principled distance” between the state and religion is obfuscated?

“Secularism as principled distance is being brutally crushed,” Bhargava said to The Wire.

“In the current conjuncture, secularism is out of the picture. Secularism has been abandoned. Hardly a moment for any kind of celebration. Once secularism is set aside, the relevant question is what kind of a religion centred state is replacing a secular state? Here there are three possibilities: one is theocracy. In a classic theocracy, a religious head such as the Shankaracharya should become PM. But this is not being witnessed. In the second kind of religious centred state, there is a very close alliance between the big leaders of a religious community and the state. Both the religious and the political leaders are virtually equal partners in running the state. This too is not happening here. Then what is it? It appears that there is a third model. Here, the state has merged with religion entirely on its own terms.”

On January 12, ahead of the consecration ceremony in Ayodhya, Modi announced in an audio message that he will be starting 11-day rituals to prepare for the event and said that God had “made him the representative of the people of India” to be present at the ceremony.

“This reminds me of the Divine Rights of the King,” said Bhargava.

“We have somebody who is acting like the king and has announced that divinity is passing through him or he is chosen by God, by the divine voice to perform this ceremony. This is a total subsumption of religion by politics. The line between the religion and the state has been broken down and is breaking down entirely at the initiative of the state which is dictating how religion and religious ceremonies are to be conducted.”

In an interview with The Indian Express, former Union minister and senior BJP leader Ravi Shankar Prasad upon being asked on the blurring lines between religion and state said: “Felicitating the grand ceremony, arranging for that does not mean blurring the lines… The prime minister is going there as a real worshipper of Lord Ram, and he is following the required discipline for it.”

Hilal Ahmed, associate professor at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies said that the idea of constitutional morality becomes crucial.

“The event can be seen from two different perspectives. One could argue that this is actually a cultural event. The active participation of political leaders representing the state authority, hence, may be interpreted as an acceptable act on legal technical grounds. Many BJP leaders are making arguments of this kind. We must remember that in the Indian context, giving money to a mosque or a temple or politician going to religious events are acceptable.

“However, there is another way to look at this event. The idea of constitutional morality becomes crucial in this regard. It is expected from the state to maintain a principled distance from religious affairs. Two questions might be raised here: is it possible to disassociate religious elements from the inauguration ceremony? Is it a religious event or not? Secondly, are people of all religions going to be included in this celebration or would they feel excluded? From this perspective, it might deviate from the distinctiveness of the idea of secularism and constitutional morality in the Indian context.”

While the opposition INDIA alliance has decided to stay away from the event in Ayodhya, they have instead found alternative ways to platform their Hindu identity. The Congress announced its decision to not attend the ceremony in Ayodhya calling it a BJP-RSS event, but former party president Rahul Gandhi will be visiting a temple in Assam during his ongoing Bharat Jodo Nyay Yatra. West Bengal chief minister and Trinamool Congress chief Mamata Banerjee will hold a harmony rally in Kolkata but only after visiting a Kali Temple in Kolkata. The Delhi government under the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) is organising a three-day Ram Lila in the national capital, while Shiv Sena (Uddhav Thackeray fact) will see former Maharashtra chief minister Uddhav Thackeray in Nashik where he will offer prayers at the Kalaram Temple.

Ahmed said that while the political discourse might be centred around the BJP, the role of the other political parties needs to be looked at as well.

“The Supreme Court judgement on the Ayodhya title suit was based on a certain legal technicality. It didn’t subscribe to Hindutva claims. If you read the judgement, you find that the court invokes secular legal principles. It gives land to the party representing the Ram Lalla Virajman. At the same time, it recognises the destruction of Babri Masjid as a criminal act and asks the state to give five acres of land to construct a new mosque. Nobody is talking about these details. The entire political class gives us the impression that the court has accepted the Hindutva claim and for that reason Hindutva politics is invincible. The Opposition wants to break the monopoly of BJP on Hindutva or for that matter Ram Temple.”

Rahul Verma, fellow at the Centre for Policy Research (CPR), said that the event presents a “dilemma” for other political parties.

“If they go there it is a problem if they don’t then also it’s a problem. That is why it is a dilemma for them. And there is no easy answer. But this is not going to be helpful. They should think real hard on this question and think about what their politics on this is going to be, so they are only reacting at the moment. Of course if your opponent is in a dilemma it helps the BJP but only time will tell whether it will bring votes or not. But the opposition is in a bind on this question and there is no doubt about that,” he said.

According to Ahmed, in post 2014 India, the political class has lost interest in the politics of secularism.

“It doesn’t mean that secularism has become irrelevant in the context. People adhere to secular values in various ways. Politically speaking, the BJP would like to use the Ayodhya celebration for 2024 elections. It doesn’t mean that the party is not aware of the limitations of the Ram Temple as a political issue. There is a serious competition for Hindu votes. Every political party is interested in capitalising on Hindu sentiments. So BJP is not the only party which will use Hindutva for political gains,” he said.

Mridula Mukherjee, former professor of history at Jawaharlal Nehru University and former director of Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, said that January 22 represents a new turn in India’s post-independence history.

“It is not about the prime minister attending the event but it is much more. He is actually the main character in the consecration ceremony, he is performing religious functions. Inaugurating a temple is very different from performing religious functions in the consecration ceremony. In my understanding it is not within the permissible framework of the Indian Constitution,” she said.

Mukherjee said that while it is a religious event in which a temple is being consecrated, “the purpose to which it is being put is clearly political”.

“In the classic sense the use of religion for political gains is what we call communalism, whether Hindu or Muslim or Christian or Jew.”

(Courtesy: The Wire.)