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Trump Bends the Arc of History in West Asia

Iran’s Islamic revolution is in transition

My one-week visit to Tehran to observe the presidential election last June came as an eye-opener. I could sense beyond doubt that Iran was on the cusp of profound changes. The country, which I had known professionally for decades ever since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, was heaving with high expectations of a radical change of course.

The surest sign of it was the tacit encouragement from Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei for the reformist candidacy of Masoud Pezeshkian. One of the colossal failures of the Western policy toward Iran has been all along its stereo-typed notions about Iran which is most evident in the reluctance to appreciate Khamenei’s role. Khamenei realises that the country is crying out for change. The point is, Iran is on the one hand all but in the league of big powers in its indigenously developed military technology testifying to its mastery in technology, research and innovation and industrial scale production capability but with an economy, on the other hand, in dire straits and ordinary people facing steady decline in their purchasing power and quality of life.

Khamenei deduced that time has come for a peaceful orderly transition within the Islamic system, which required national unity. In Pezeshkian, Khamenei saw a politician with an unblemished record of probity in public life and of strong convictions. Hailing from an Azeri-Kurdish family, Pezeshkian’s understanding of the alchemy that is needed in governance to create unity in diversity in a plural society like Iran is unrivalled.

Above all, he is a deeply religious man, a teacher of the Quran, and a reciter of the Nahj al-balagha, a key text for Shia Muslims, who is committed to the Islamic system of Velayat-e faqih, based on the principle of guardianship of Islamic jurists. Khamenei saw in him a rare politician who can bridge the political divide between the reformist and conservative factions and therefore as the best hope for energising the Islamic system and renewing its support base.

Late night chat shows on television are hugely popular in Iran and particularly so through an animated election campaign, as they brought out the plurality of political opinion surfacing — to which I was invited to participate every day. The main streams of thinking in front runner Pezeshkian’s electoral platform could be summarised as follows:

• The topmost priority is to improve the economy, which is best achieved through the lifting of western sanctions.
• A prerequisite in such a direction requires the resolution of the nuclear issue through negotiations with the US, which is feasible now that Iran is a “threshold nuclear power” with a formidable missile capability that already acts as deterrent against foreign aggression.
• Ensuing from the above, Iran needs to engage with the West by recalibrating the foreign policy directions and national strategy to enhance mutual confidence.
• A Donald Trump presidency would be the “X” factor but, nonetheless, his priorities could be different this time around, and at any rate Iran should be open to negotiations with the US.
• The nation desires social reforms and controversies such as mandatory hijab are best avoided, since they created tensions and divides in society that opened the door to foreign interference, through tolerance and patience in the fulness of time while intrusive state control to impose social norms is unwise.
• Economic revival requires switch to market economy and for fostering trade and encouraging foreign investment, an overall opening up is needed in such areas as the Internet, visa system, etc.
• Late president Ebrahim Raisi’s accent on the Persian Gulf countries being Iran’s First Circle in foreign policies was a fundamentally forward-looking move and needs to be followed through — in particular, the criticality of consolidating the impetus from the rapprochement with Saudi Arabia that also happens to be in sync with the historic shift in the Saudi regional strategies encapsulated in the so-called Vision 2030 anchored on a thriving economy, turning its back on using extremist jihadi groups as geopolitical tool in West Asia and undertaking social reforms of a historic nature to modernise the Kingdom.

The last point is hugely important in the present context, as Tehran is committed to the rapprochement with Saudi Arabia which was brokered by China. It has not only reduced the bilateral tensions and erased the conflict of interests, the latest examples being Tehran’s acquiescence with the changes in the power structure in Syria and Lebanon where a palpable Sunni ascendancy is under way — but also encourages Saudis to diversify foreign policies and step out of the US orbit.

In strategic terms, Iran is gaining insofar as the locus of Saudi regional policies has shifted and decades-old US-Israeli strategy to isolate Tehran is no longer working. The Persian Gulf states have sought to reassure Iran of their neutrality in any conflict with Israel. Again, Iran’s normalisation with Egypt testifies to its growing acceptability as a regional partner by major Sunni states.

The regional amity in the Persian Gulf and the growing difficulty to rally the Sunni Arab states against Iran has no doubt unnerved the Biden Administration and Netanyahu. On January 2, Axios broke the sensational story that the outgoing White House National Security advisor Jake Sullivan recently presented President Joe Biden at a secret meeting with options for potential American strikes on Iranian nuclear sites before the inauguration of Donald Trump later this month.

The Axios cited sources admitting that “the meeting was not sparked by new intelligence” and Biden was yet to make a “final decision”. Axios’ source called the meeting as part of “prudent scenario planning.” That is to say, there was no intelligence input or emergent situation to justify an attack on Iran and Biden was testing the waters — as he often did on such crucial issues after green lighting the policy shift, such as, for example, giving Ukraine F-16 fighter jets or ATACMS missiles or approval for hitting Russian territory.

In this case, there is no daylight between Biden and his team which is packed with arch neocons — especially, Sullivan and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, the two super hawks responsible for giving full-throttle American support to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the pursuit of his horrific West Asian war stretching from Gaza, Lebanon, Syria to Yemen.

Netanyahu has been dreaming for a very long time about an attack on Iran to destroy that country’s rise as a regional power, but that remains a pipe dream without direct US involvement. It is entirely conceivable that Sullivan who eats out of Netanyahu’s hands acted on the latter’s behest and Biden was likely aware of that.

At any rate, in another follow-up report on January 6, Axios revisited the topic to hype up that a military option against Iran has become “a real possibility”. Curiously, the report claimed that after a meeting with Trump in November, Israeli Minister of Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer, a close confidante of Netanyahu, the latter “came away thinking there was a high likelihood Trump would either support an Israeli military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities — something the Israelis are seriously considering — or even order a US strike.”

Israelis are great hustlers and such an attribution to Trump was factually unwarranted, given his known aversion to wars. Plainly put, it was a white lie and crude “psywar” aimed at creating misconceptions. In fact, Axios noted as a corrective in its report that there is a “flip side”, as “others close to Trump expect that he’ll seek a deal before considering a strike” (against Iran).

Trump frogmarches Netanyahu down the deep stairs

President Joe Biden, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and their key operative in the White House, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, hopelessly underestimated President-elect Donald Trump’s quick reflex action to demolish their demonic plot to kickstart a war with Iran by attacking its nuclear installations just before the new president’s inauguration.

Trump was on guard about the “real possibility” that Biden team might create an alibi to attack Iran and trigger a regional war in the final phase of transfer of power that would get him bogged down in a quagmire and potentially derail his administration’s foreign policy strategies on the whole.

The point is, it is in West Asia that Trump’s presidency is threatened by the spectre of a foreign and military policy quagmire — not in Eurasia or Asia-Pacific, much as stakes are high in those two theatres as well. For, Israel’s security is also about US domestic politics!

Indeed, Trump played cool and kept his thoughts to himself. He even allowed a free run for Netanyahu’s grandstanding to project that he had a special equation with Trump and that the latter had planned to confront Iran militarily.

Trump’s choice of Steve Witkoff, a Jew, as his special envoy for West Asia, went relatively unnoticed. Witkoff is an unknown political newcomer in Trump’s incoming team but it may signify the marginalisation of Jared Kushner and the burial of the Abraham Accords.

Certainly, Witkoff, a self-made billionaire (son of a maker of ladies’ coats in New York City), is an interesting choice because he has no previous experience in international diplomacy and his expertise lies in demolishing properties that outlived their utility and erect new edifices and making massive profits out of it — ie., a New York real estate developer and investor like Trump himself. Trump has known his tough negotiating skills, his tenacity to break concrete walls and clinch deals, and create innovative designs in trying conditions.

Trump saw in Witkoff just the man to frogmarch Netanyahu. It was a made-to-order situation, as Trump was determined not to inherit the catastrophic stalemate in West Asia that Biden was leaving behind in league with Netanyahu — with American influence and prestige in the pits regionally and Israel’s reputation irreparably damaged internationally.

Witkoff hit the ground running, as he flew into Tel Aviv to deliver the astonishing message to Netanyahu that Trump wanted a deal in Gaza in place by the time he took office. News soon emerged last week on Israel’s Channel 12 that Trump sent a message to officials in Tel Aviv, urging Israel to avoid any “unnecessary” escalation and refrain from statements that could lead to regional conflicts, particularly during the transition period before his administration begins.

Channel 12 added that “Trump’s aides informed Israeli officials that the incoming US administration aims to achieve stability in the Middle East, focusing on fostering “peace” between Israel and Lebanon and maintaining the ongoing ceasefire.

The report went on to say, “In his discussions with Israeli officials, Trump emphasised that he had no intention of engaging in new wars during the early days of his presidency, as he intends to prioritise addressing domestic issues in the United States.”

Quite obviously, Trump sensed that Netanyahu was orchestrating a doomsday scenario to force his hands at a time when Tehran had been signalling repeatedly that it had no intentions whatsoever to pursue a nuclear weapon programme and has vowed to make 2025 the year when the Iran nuclear issue can be settled with the West. President Masoud Pezeshkian himself has made this pledge alongside an offer to negotiate with the US.

Meanwhile, a powerful neocon voice also appeared giving rationalisation for the Israeli plans to push Trump into the war path. This came in the form of an essay in the Foreign Affairs magazine which appeared on January 6 authored by none other than Richard Haas at the Council of Foreign Relations.

Haas is a prominent fixture in the US foreign policy establishment and his article titled The Iran Opportunity aimed at drumming up opinion against Trump venturing into any breakthrough with Iran as he had done vis-a-vis North Korea in his first term. Haas was transmitting the Israeli signal.

Substantively, Haas’ article was a huge disappointment — a rehash of the fantasises and falsehoods that went for Washington’s Iran policy during the past four decades. Importantly, with no empirical evidence to back up the argument, he insisted that Iran is a much diminished power today after the takeover in Syria by Islamist groups, and a window of opportunity has opened to settle scores with Tehran. In sum, Haas literally reproduced the Israeli narrative under his byline, a wilful deception which gives no credit to his reputation.

However, Trump didn’t like Netanyahu hustling him. Trump remembers how Netanyahu led him up the garden path to order the assassination of the top Iranian general Qassem Soleimani on 3rd January 2020 and then himself scooted at the last minute no sooner than the operation actually got under way, leaving Trump to face the music! (Interestingly, Pezeshkian told NBC News in an interview last week that Tehran never issued any fatwa against Trump on account of Soleimani’s death.)

Trump wouldn’t allow himself to be taken for a ride by Netanyahu all over again, and he explicitly posted on Truth Social a harsh remark about Netanyahu (“deep, dark son of a bitch”) by the American strategic thinker Prof. Jeffrey Sachs at Columbia University in an hour-long event hosted by the Cambridge Union in the UK last month to make the point bluntly that he has no such warm feelings or camaraderie toward Netanyahu (to put it mildly.)

Sachs made copious references to Israel’s pivotal role in triggering regional wars and posted a red alert to the incoming US administration that Netanyahu is on the march again — this time, to start a war with Iran — and Trump should not walk into that trap.

There is no question that the latest Gaza deal was literally shoved down Netanyahu’s throat by Witkoff. According to Israeli reports, Witkoff called Netanyahu’s office from Doha where he was camping to seek a meeting in Tel Aviv last weekend but only to be told off that Friday was the time for Jewish Sabbath. Whereupon, Witkoff, reportedly, used an expletive and summoned Netanyahu to a meeting. Which, of course, Netanyahu complied with. By the way, Israeli cabinet’s formal approval for the Gaza deal was already available within 24 hrs thereafter.

Now, Witkoff, with Trump’s approval of course, “plans to be a near-constant presence in the region in an attempt to prevent the deal from unraveling” and is considering a visit to Gaza Strip “as part of his efforts to keep a ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas on track, according to a transition official with direct knowledge of the ceasefire process.”

Trump may be looking beyond the Gaza deal. The positive response from Tehran and the Arab capitals (as well as the overwhelming international support) provides a stimulus for Trump to follow through. Trump understands that West Asia has transformed beyond recognition since he left office and the Iran-Saudi rapprochement and consequent historic shift in Saudi strategy is a crucial template.

The big question is how far Trump will go to bend the arc of history — specifically, will he engage with Tehran? No doubt, back channels are at work — eg., reported meeting on Nov 11 between Elon Musk, close adviser to Trump and Iran’s ambassador to the UN. All sorts of possibilities exist.

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Russia-Iran Treaty Signifies a ‘Breakthrough’ in Ties

Russia and Iran, as two immediate neighbours and great powers with a glorious history, had a difficult, chequered relationship through centuries. It goes to the credit of Iranian pragmatism that it learned to live with the consequences of Tsarist Russia’s expansionism rather than getting locked in eternal enmity. In some ways, it also shared the plight of China at the hands of predatory powers. Such bitter experiences inevitably get embedded in a nation’s psyche.

Therefore, the signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty between Iran and Russia on January 17 in Moscow is indeed a poignant landmark signifying the mutual acceptance as partners in an equal relationship. It is also an attempt to build guardrails so as to enable a new trajectory of relationship in mutual interests. The Russian President Vladimir Putin aptly called it a “breakthrough”.

The negotiations were protracted and the signing of the document by the two presidents Vladimir Putin and Masoud Pezeshkian itself got postponed. But anyone who has negotiated with Iranians would know they often scramble at the last minute with fresh proposals and are at all times tough negotiators — especially, in strategic areas like energy.

On the other hand, both Russia and Iran are intensely conscious that this is a top-down relationship. Russians are quite aware that they are dealing with a new leadership in Tehran that prioritises the improvement of Iran’s relations with the West and focuses on its Gulf neighbours who are close allies of the US.

Although Putin approved the draft treaty as far back as last September, the signing of the document itself was deferred. Russia appreciates the rationality and self-restraint that Iran exercises in the development of nuclear programme and its brilliant achievement to attain deterrent capability without developing nuclear weapons. Conversely, Russians would certainly know that Iranians will never barter away their sovereign prerogatives and strategic autonomy with any country.

However, the transition in Tehran following the death of former president Ebrahim Raisi introduced created an element of uncertainty as the ensuing closely-fought election and formation of a new government turned out to be a “regime change” of sorts.

The foreign policy strategy of the new government led by Pezeshkian — improving Iran’s ties with Gulf neighbours (and the West) — is pivoted on the resolution of the nuclear question with the US, which holds the key to the lifting of western sanctions that is the pathway to Iran’s economic recovery.

That said, the political will at the leadership level for building a strategic partnership in a long-term perspective is not in doubt. Both Russia and Iran envisage tactical and strategic advantages in working together closely in the conditions under sanctions. Interestingly, Article 19 of the Treaty devotes much attention to the sharing of experiences on how to push back the draconian western sanctions.

Pezeshkian underscored that ahead of his visit to Moscow, he spoke with the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who emphasised “how important it is to develop comprehensive relations with Russia.” The warm, respectful and trustful interaction between Putin and Khamenei has been the lodestar of the relationship in the recent decade. Much will depend on the leadership position after Khamenei, 86, the Vali-e Faqih or supreme jurisprudent who exercises ultimate authority over all branches of the government, and is Iran’s commander-in-chief.

The salience of the treaty lies in the expansion and deepening of military cooperation, a big leap forward in energy ties with some mega projects on the anvil such as oil swaps and a brand new gas pipeline through Azerbaijan with a planned capacity of 55 bcm, joint efforts on de-dollarisation and clearing system in local currency and, on the whole, a qualitatively new level of coordination in the foreign policy strategies of the two countries in both bilateral and multilateral framework such as EAEU, BRICS and SCO.

However, integration into the Eurasian matrix may suit Iran only up to a point, since Tehran gives the highest importance to its strategic autonomy and historically lacked a “bloc mentality.” Curiously, Article 3 of the treaty painstakingly flags the maleficent activities that neither side should undertake against the other!

Iran doesn’t face the threat of foreign aggression and the agreement falls short of the mutual defence treaty Russia has with North Korea or the US has with over half a dozen Latin American countries and the Philippines (but not Israel.) Nonetheless, Pezeshkian has said that a full-fledged military cooperation with Russia is now possible. “The enemy should have no illusions that we can easily be defeated,” he remarked and left it at that.

The treaty does not obligate the two countries to come to the other’s defence if one is attacked; they agree, instead, not to provide military or other assistance to the aggressor!

Suffice to say, the treaty falls short of an alliance while it could, arguably, have the “butterfly effect” of an alliance on regional politics. Iran has experienced that Russia remained passive vis-a-vis the intensive and relentless Israeli air attacks against its deployments in Syria. Moscow even put in place a deconfliction mechanism in place bilaterally with Tel Aviv to prevent mistaken attacks on each other — although Russia and Iran were fighting on the same side as comrades-in-arms during the Syrian civil war.

The treaty will be severely tested if a US-Iran rapprochement gets under way during President Donald Trump’s presidency — however preposterous that might seem. But Iran’s dependence on Russia will only increase if Trump reverts to the “maximum pressure” strategy and works to undercut the growing Saudi-Iranian amity to persuade Riyadh to normalise with Israel in the spirit of the Abraham Accords and reset its foreign policy compass to the default position casting Iran in adversarial terms.

Prima facie, this is unlikely to happen, since a Middle Eastern conflict is not in Trump’s agenda. In fact, the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s call to Trump on Wednesday highlighted an offer to invest $600 billion, underscoring the shift in the Kingdom’s regional priorities. The White House readout also stressed “efforts to bring stability to the Middle East, bolster regional security, and combat terrorism… and Saudi Arabia’s international economic ambitions over the next four years as well as trade and other opportunities to increase the mutual prosperity.” There was no reference to Iran.

Agreements per se do not change anything. The key lies in their implementation. The construction of Bushehr nuclear power plant got unduly delayed as Russians dragged their feet under pressure from the US and Israel forcing Tehran to file a case claiming damages. Of course, circumstances are different today but how far Russia will be willing to transfer advanced military technology to Iran remains an open question.

The prospects of the Russia-Iran treaty becoming a game changer in regional politics will also depend on the current transformation in Saudi-Iranian normalisation and the related trends in regional politics consolidating. Russia becomes a stakeholder in reinforcing such trends. There is no question that with growing uncertainties in Russian-Turkish relations and the rivalries in the Black Sea (which is no longer a “Russian lake”), Iran becomes a key partner in Russia’s regional connectivity. Unsurprisingly, the treaty acknowledges that cooperation in the Caspian Sea region is vital.

Russia’s keenness to get the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) fully operational is self-evident. The treaty (Articles 20 and 21) dwells on the transportation sector as a strategic area in the Russian-Iranian relationship. Iran stands to gain in its positioning as a dependable regional hub connecting Russia with some of the key countries in the Global South, including India and Pakistan.

(Ambassador M.K. Bhadrakumar served the Indian Foreign Service for more than 29 years. Courtesy: Indian Punchline, the author’s blog.)