Convening of the Emergency National Assembly on 31 May 2022 marks the apogee of the
most torrid fortnight of the talks. Apparently, the fraught issue of Naga flag and constitution
is at the root of the current instability. That trust has been a casualty is borne out in the
statements of those involved in peace negotiations. Acknowledging that something’s amiss
with the official channel of communication, the core committee of the parliamentary
committee on Naga political issue (CCoNPI), on 28 May 2022 sought the support of
Assam chief minister Himanta Biswa Sarma to continue the negotiation process. NSCN-IM
chairperson Q Tuccu, on 31 May 2022, expressed his distrust thus, “The past record of
political agreements with India has given us bitter lessons and we have to stand guard
against any Naga accord that betrayed our rights and national identity.”
Mixed messaging on Naga flag and constitution has further confounded the situation. In
his week-long visit to Dimapur, from 19 April 2022, Mr. A K Mishra had, on 23 April 2022,
reportedly assured NSCN (IM) leadership of his commitment to the Framework
Agreement. However, upon his return to Delhi on 26 April 2022, sources in the Home
Ministry informed the media that the interlocutor had informed the NSCN (IM) of
government’s opposition to the demand of Naga flag and constitution. Centre’s
confabulations with the Naga political leadership in the second half of May 2022,
subsequent to the failed attempt to bring NSCN (IM) back on the negotiating table, added
to the confusion. While Mr. S C Jamir and Mr. Y Patton claimed centre’s steadfast rejection
of the demand of Naga flag and constitution; Mr. K Nienu asserted the contrary. The circle
was nicely squared when Mr. Hemanta Biswa Sharma after publicly disavowing to
intercede in the Naga talks on 1st May 2022 not only met the CCoPNI on 2nd May but also
declared that there are ample possibilities of further negotiations.
The discord over Naga flag and constitution though intractable can be traced back to
August 2019. So is the offer of use of Naga flag on ceremonial occasions; in April 2021 Mr.
Amit Shah reportedly informed Mr. N Rio that the flag could be used during Naga
community events and functions throughout pan Naga Hoho areas. The attempted
retraction on the already agreed upon issue of Regional Autonomous Territorial Council
(RATC) by the interlocutor poses a new challenge as it is akin to turning the wheels of
negotiations backward. Sensing the fallout of this reversal Mr. T R Zeliang issued a
recorded appeal on 5th May, urging the negotiating parties – GoI and NSCN(IM) — not to
revert on issues already agreed upon during the tenure, as interlocutor, of Mr. R N Ravi
and Mr. A K Mishra.
Attempting to analyse the crisis of Naga talks in terms of obduracy of the negotiating
parties on the issues of the Framework Agreement, Naga flag and constitution, misses that
the introduction of Doval doctrine, premised on principle of uber etatism, has profoundly
altered Indian statecraft. Akin to the absolutist philosophers of late medieval Europe Doval
projects State as a sovereign; a territory, a constitution, a flag and an army are the
markers of its sovereign will. A sovereign state does not recognize any limits or divisions to
its will within its territorial jurisdiction. Undercutting the liberal definition of democracy
expounded by Mill, for Doval a sovereign state imposes a value system of service above
self and, hence, is much superior to individual morality. Such a turgid definition of state as
a sovereign, compromises its ability to accommodate the varieties of pre-existing and
currently demanded special administrative /political arrangements.

Adopted as the principle of Indian statecraft in Doval’s second tenure as National Security
Adviser (NSA), its impact is evident in the dismantling of the existing special arrangement
in Kashmir and in stymieing the demanded unique settlement of the Naga political issue.
Abrogation of articles 370 and 35A on 5th August 2019 has been justified as governments
desire to uphold the constitutional principles like the right to equality before the law (Article
14), right against discrimination (Article 15), and the right to settle anywhere in India
(Article 19). That upholding the constitutional principles may not be the primary motive
behind the repeal is borne by the inclusion of the UT of Ladakh under the sixth schedule
which imposes restrictions on permanent residence, purchase of property etc., of
outsiders, similar to that of article 35A. Article 35A was abrogated as it drew its authority
from the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution adopted on 17 November 1956, while in sixth
schedule the Governor is vested with powers regarding the councils. Ergo, the abrogation
of the said articles was aimed at untrammelled extension of the sovereignty of the state.
Prior to the implementation of the Doval doctrine development of the peace initiative,
though glacial, produced a series of joint statements/communiques – of 14 June 2001, 11
July 2002, and 31 January 2006 between the interlocutor Mr. K Padmanabhaia and Th.
Muivah, General Secretary, NSCN (IM). On 18 July 2011 a further joint statement was
signed between Mr. R S Pandey (interlocutor) and Th. Muivah. These statements testify to
the increasing convergence where both negotiating parties accepted the uniqueness of
Naga history and situation, with a desire to achieve a lasting political solution between
India and NSCN as two entities without territorial limits. The Framework Agreement signed
on 3 August 2015 is a logical culmination of this process of convergence and trust.
Rigidities imposed by the Doval doctrine ensured that Framework Agreement, based on
the principle of shared sovereignty, could not be a suitable foundation of future relationship
between Centre and the Nagas. Thus, the attempts to bring it into controversy and to
question its efficacy. In an interview in December 2019 Mr. G K Pillai questioned the
efficacy of the Framework Agreement since, according to him, GoI could not offer anything
beyond statehood and Article 371A. In August 2020, an unsigned and edited text of the
Framework Agreement was circulated to the 14 tribe leaders, NNPGs, NTC and Nagaland
GB Federation. Since the text was not a public document and was in the custody of the
GoI and NSCN (IM), the latter blamed Mr. R N Ravi for the circulation of the edited
document. Irrespective of the veracity of the allegation the act succeeded in creating a
controversy around the Framework Agreement.
Uber etatism does not continence notions of shared sovereignty, separate flag and
constitution hence the obligation to whittle them in the final solution. Signing of an
agreement, in November 2017, between the GoI and the Working Committee (WC) of the
six Naga National Political Groups (NNPGs) has been read as an aspect of divide and rule
policy. However, since 2019 it has been deployed as a tactical trope to whittle down the
Framework Agreement to a minimalist agreement. Under R N Ravi the agreement reached
with NNPG was utilized to coax the NSCN (IM) to sign on the issues agreed upon as on
31st October 2019 and leave the issues of shared sovereignty, etc., for resolution at a later
date. Etatism has ensured that the attempts at watering down the Framework Agreement
have been impervious to the change of interlocutor. Under A K Mishra the insistence that
inclusive settlement of the Naga political issue must include aspects of the settlement
reached with the NNPGs is, indeed, a version of the tactics to make the Framework
Agreement compliant to etatism.
The convening of Emergency National Assembly on 31st May 2022 may be viewed as a
response to this tightening of screws around peace negotiations. By holding a meeting

attended by approximately 2000 delegates from the civil, military and political wings of the
NSCN (IM), it has been conveyed that the organization is united behind its leadership, and
the demand of shared sovereignty, Naga flag and constitution. A clear line of demarcation
is sought to be drawn between the NSCN (IM) and other organizations/leaders with Eno Q
Tuccu stating, “We have come across the stand of the Government of India on the core
issues of Naga flag, constitution and integration and echoed by some Naga leaders. We
have also seen how some Naga political leaders have expressed their derisive attitude
towards Framework Agreement…These people had stoop themselves…after they gather
the subtle hints from their Delhi based political bosses.” It sought to bring back the
Framework Agreement to the centre stage of the peace negotiations, “In August 3, 2015
we signed the historic Framework Agreement with deep political insight taking into
consideration the Naga people’s sovereign rights and dignity…
…We cannot allow these people to defile Naga political issue by bringing another Naga
political Agreement.” Finally, it asserted the significance of Naga flag and constitution for
Naga identity and Naga political issue, “How can we forfeit Naga National Flag and Naga
Constitution in the name of Naga political solution?”
Divergence between the understanding on final solution to the Naga political issue
between the interlocutors and the leadership of NSCN (IM) is evident. The demonstration
of its strength and resolve in the Emergency National assembly poses a quandary; as the
largest organisation NSCN (IM) could significantly reduce the possibility of bypassing the
Framework Agreement and the demands of Naga flag and constitution in the final solution.
Success of NSCN (IM) seeking the removal of R N Ravi, widely understood as the patron
of NNPGs and some Naga civil groups, has made it clear that the latter may not be an
adequate ballast to the NSCN (IM). Perhaps this explains the incendiary public statements
since late May 2022, aimed at creating a divide between the Nagaland Nagas and those
residing in other states, especially the southern Nagas. A ploy similar to that adopted in
the 1960s around the 16 Point Agreement resulting in bloodletting amongst Naga tribes.
Such incendiary public pronouncement while they may cause a significant social upheaval,
their efficacy in compelling NSCN (IM) to accept the bypassing of the Framework
agreement is doubtful. Past experience of military movements suggests that their
recruitment increases during times of civil strife. Destabilizing Naga society may also
adversely impact the policy measures related to internal security and international policy.
Off late, there have been reports of efforts to bring Paresh Baruah led ULFA (I) to the
negotiating table. On 16th May 2022 in an hour-long freewheeling interview Paresh
Baruah had stated that while the accords reached by the Bodos, etc. were conducted
within the ambit of Indian constitution, he desired a negotiation outside the framework of
Indian constitution as was being done in the case of Naga peace process. The interview
made it abundantly clear that, if concluded satisfactorily, the Naga talks will become a
template for negotiations for organizations such as ULFA (I) that seek a resolution of their
political demands outside the framework of Indian constitution. More recently, in an
interview on 4th June 2022 Paresh Baruah was reported to have stated, “The situation is
not conducive, if the GoI misses out on a chance to sign an agreement with the
Nagas…They (NSCN-IM) have descaled a step on its core demand and now are ready to
sign an agreement with India on the separate set of demands that includes separate flag
and constitution. It’s time that India accepts it in a effort towards taming the overall
situation in the region.”
There is a very significant connection between the current Naga talks and the Look East
policy, initiated by PM Narasimha Rao in 1991, to bolster India as a counterweight to the

strategic influence of China in Southeast Asia. The policy aimed at developing north
eastern region as a gateway to Southeast Asia by developing multilateral organisations,
and trans-national infrastructural projects. India became a sectoral dialogue partner with
ASEAN in 1992, in 1995 was given an advisory status, a member of the Council for
Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum in
1996. With India’s expanding presence in the ASEAN the need to pacify the turbulent
Northeast, to facilitate the economic and infrastructural projects, dawned upon the political
leadership. PM Narasimha Rao deputed Mr. Rajesh Pilot to prepare the grounds for a
meeting with the NSCN (IM) leadership in Paris on 12th June 1995. The initiative resulted
in the Indo-Naga peace process when on 25 July 1997 during the premiership of I K Gujral
ceasefire was declared with NSCN (IM).
The two and a half decades long peace process enabled India to launch of series of
projects to increase Indian presence in ASEAN and to contain China influence in the
region. The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project was conceived in 2003 and the
governments of India and Myanmar signed an Agreement for its implementation in 2008.
India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway was proposed in 2002 in a trilateral meeting
in Yangoon. In 2017 the India-Japan Act East Forum was created to coordinate, plan and
implement projects being undertaken with Japanese assistance. On 27th May 2022 NADI3
Asian Confluence River Conclave in Guwahati, emphasised the development of northeast
as the link between India and ASEAN and as bridge to Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and
Myanmar through projects.
The US led alliance initiative to contain a strident China in the Indo-Pacific, has further
enhanced the strategic significance of Northeast for containing Chinese influence in the
ASEAN. India has also witnessed an escalation along the LAC in the northeast sector. In
such a scenario any attempt to destabilise this crucial frontier region, either socially or
politically is inadvisable. It will be sobering to remember that the activities of Burma based
militia groups is one of the important reasons for the inordinate delay in the completion of
the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project.
(Kumar Sanjay Singh, Associate Professor, Department of History, Swami Shraddhanand
College, Delhi University.)