The presidential and parliamentary elections in Bolivia have resulted in a substantial and complete reversal in the Andean country’s politics.
Senator Rodrigo Paz Pereira and former president Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga will contest the Bolivian presidency in the second round on October 19.
Similarly, the results for the Senate and the Lower House of the Plurinational State Congress suggest a significant shift in the balance of electoral forces, considering that the ruling Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party has lost all its Senate seats and has barely won a single seat in the Chamber of Deputies.
This result, like the extensive political process that preceded it, deserves a comprehensive analysis that includes various aspects.
About the election results
Paz and Quiroga were the most voted candidates in the presidential elections on Sunday, August 17.
Rodrigo Paz (Christian Democratic Party) obtained more than 1,561,000 votes, or 32.08%. Quiroga (Free Alliance) obtained more than 1,311,000 votes, or 26.94%, according to preliminary results released by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) with more than 90% of the votes counted.
Behind them was businessman Samuel Doria Medina, who, according to polls, was the favorite, with 19.93%.
Meanwhile, the main left-wing candidate and outgoing president of the Senate, Andrónico Rodríguez, came in fourth with 8.15%. The ruling party (MAS) candidate, Eduardo del Castillo, obtained 3.16%.
However, the most important and equally symptomatic issues surrounding the election lie in the other general data revealed by these elections.
This contest marks a break with the political dynamic of the last 20 years in the country, in which the winning party secured victory with a large majority in the first round.
The Bolivian Constitution establishes that a candidate can win the presidency in the first round if they obtain more than 50% of the valid votes, or at least 40% with a difference of ten percentage points over the runner-up. This is the first time this has not happened since the existence of the second round for presidential elections.
Another significant fact is that Bolivia is a country with compulsory voting, and failure to go to the polls can result in fines.
In these elections, 88.8% of the electorate turned out to vote, the first time this has happened in a presidential election in more than two decades.
Another relevant fact is the number of invalid votes, 1,252,449, and 158,270 blank votes. Together, these amount to 1,410,719 votes.
At this point, it is important to clarify that former president Evo Morales called for null votes and blank votes, and that the winning candidate in the first round, Rodrigo Paz, received 1,625,882 votes.
What the figures suggest is that, in purely political (rather than electoral) terms, Morales’ call became the second political force in the election, as it exceeded the 1,356,370 votes obtained by Quiroga.
The data reflects a fragmentation of all spectrums of Bolivian politics, diametrically from left to right.
But there is also a noticeable general disenchantment with national politics. No political force is strong enough on its own, and the eligible leaders were structurally weak in the face of the conglomerate of forces and actors.
Rodrigo Paz, born in Spain due to his father’s exile, has had an extensive career in political organizations in his country, moving from the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) to Comunidad Ciudadana (Carlos Mesa’s conservative party).
Several analyses suggest that Paz would have brought together the votes of traditional opponents, politically disaffiliated groups (groups dissatisfied with the traditional left and right), and even former supporters of the MAS and Evo Morales who rejected Andrónico Rodríguez.
Deeper issues behind the results
Sunday’s election is highly significant as it marks the end of a political era in Bolivia. Whether it is Paz or Quiroga, Bolivia’s next president will be a right-wing politician. The loss of power and representation by the outgoing ruling party and the historical forces that supported it is indisputable and serious.
Since the rise of the MAS as the ruling party, the country has taken the form of a plurinational state. Evo Morales promoted this cycle until his re-election was cut short in 2019 by a coup d’état.
As has been widely reported, a political struggle has arisen since the rise of Luis Arce, who confronted Morales until his prosecution.
An easy—but incomplete, and therefore erroneous—reading of the election results could conclude that the cause of the results is the division among actors of the former MAS. But there are many other elements on the table.
After Evo Morales was not allowed to register as a candidate, he called for an election boycott, calling for a null vote. Null and blank votes accounted for 21.8% of the electoral turnout.
Meanwhile, Rodríguez and Del Castillo’s votes together accounted for 11.38%. In total, the spectrum of forces that previously constituted the Bolivian political process represents 33.18% of the vote in the presidential elections. In real terms, this figure is significantly higher if we take into account that the percentage of support obtained by Paz (32.08%) is calculated on the basis of valid votes.
These figures suggest that the forces that were once united within the framework of the plurinational revolution continue to be the largest group in Bolivian politics.
This is a larger sector than the one that voted for Rodrigo Paz. And it is a political and social force that could be considerably larger, considering that 12% of registered voters did not show up at the polls at the risk of fines.
The data suggests that, despite the long period of erosion of his image, criminalization, persecution, and stigmatization of his mandate and political allies, Evo Morales will be the main reference point for the leftist opposition in Bolivia in the coming months.
Basic political science suggests that the traditional MAS voter base and the Bolivian political process sided with or leaned more toward Morales in the outcome of the long history of internal strife.
Arce’s candidate, Eduardo del Castillo, would have achieved one of the worst results—perhaps the worst—ever obtained by a ruling party in the history of elections worldwide. Rejection of Arce’s government is the only major consensus in Bolivian politics.
Meanwhile, Rodríguez has had an extremely poor result, despite being a former youth leader of the MAS, a fresh face, and president of the Senate.
One angle of analysis could conclude that Rodríguez did not make it to the second round because of a lack of support from Morales. The real problem could be that Rodríguez did not represent the aspirations of Morales or the original conglomerate of MAS and the multicultural revolution.
Rather, Rodríguez represented himself by trying to compete for space with the creation of a left-wing political offering, but with a weak campaign, disjointed territorial and sectoral organizations, and a moderate, centrist discourse, attempting to charm “center-left” voters. His strategy was a complete failure.
The data suggests that, in fact, there was a large sector of voters without political representation, without an electoral candidate. This refers directly to Morales, who was prevented from participating, which would explain some of the unprecedented elements of this election, such as the presidential runoff, the high abstention rate, the large number of invalid votes, and the organic and strategic consolidation of the left’s electoral offering.
In other words, preventing Morales from participating—through a possible deal between Luis Arce and the judiciary—distorted all the dynamics and, consequently, the results of the election.
Another major factor was the erratic and failed economic and social policy of the Arce government. Since it intensified its persecution of Morales, the government has lost the support of parliamentarians, limiting its ability to implement policies.
However, economic policy collapsed systematically due to deferred measures, other poorly implemented actions, and a sustained accumulation of the loss of the state’s material base.
Social unrest, the loss of basic living conditions, and economic deterioration became a cross-cutting issue for voters, shaping the disenchantment and disaffiliation that has taken hold across the political spectrum. But this had a particularly damaging effect on all forces associated with Masism until 2019. Rodríguez and Del Castillo were hurt by the outgoing government’s extensive economic legacy.
The future of Bolivia
The new Bolivian government will be neoliberal and conservative right-wing. Bolivia is a crucial enclave for key raw materials such as lithium. As is well known, the United States’ regional agenda vis-à-vis its strategic competitors such as China and Russia places special emphasis on the Altiplano nation.
The new government is expected to implement drastic measures in terms of concessions, at the risk of a significant loss of sovereignty over the country’s natural resources.
In terms of domestic economic policies, a significant exchange rate adjustment is also expected, as well as fuel price adjustments, a reduction in the size of the state, the end of certain subsidies, and a general adjustment of consumer prices for many goods.
The future of political actors such as Evo Morales and others belonging to social movements and coca growers is in doubt, considering who will take office between Paz and Quiroga. However, Morales’ situation is in the hands of the judiciary, and he is likely to be imprisoned.
Both Paz and Quiroga have promised to dismantle 20 years of policies, government actions, progressive social rights, organic structures, and forms of leadership of the Bolivian left, which implies the emergence of old power factors that have formed coup-plotting and neo-fascist currents in the country, encouraging political persecution and the reproduction of social unrest.
However, Bolivia’s right-wing forces remain structurally and widely divided, which also suggests obstacles to the governance of the new president, who, whoever he or she may be, will have weak legitimacy. The new president will face a context of political tension, delegitimization of representative bodies, and undoubted social unrest that will accompany the upcoming austerity measures.
An important element about this country is that the territorial and sectoral dynamics that formerly formed the basis of Morales’ support, although divided and weakened, have not been eliminated. Now, this conglomerate of actors could take on a new form, boosted by the new features of the exercise of power by a neoliberal government with an absolute parliamentary majority.
The context would suggest key conditions for a reorganization and recomposition of the forces that once shaped the Plurinational State, and it is even possible to consider that the new circumstances would allow for a strategic reunification between some actors, excluding Arce. Similarly, the conditions suggest the emergence of new leaders and actors.
The election result is tragic, but not surprising. Perhaps the plurinational revolution was factually lost since 2019, but it is now that the real conditions will come together to allow for strategic reorganization among the forces that refounded this nation almost 20 years ago. All this remains to be seen.
[Franco Vielma is a writer and political analyst. Courtesy: Internationalist 3600, an independent, socialist-oriented digital news entity known for publishing critical geopolitical analysis and investigative journalism. It zeroes in on narratives often overlooked by mainstream outlets—especially regarding struggles against imperialism and for social justice.]
