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Hezbollah’s Next Move

Suleiman Mourad

Since Hamas’s attack on October 7, the Israeli retaliation has unleashed staggering levels of destruction – with the Palestinian death toll now exceeding 10,000. The US has hurried two airplane carriers and several destroyers to the region, along with special military personnel, to bolster its ally and ward off any possible intervention from Iran or Hezbollah. The latter has been engaged in tit-for-tat hostilities with Israel on its northern border, which runs for a hundred kilometers from the Naqoura in the west to the Shebaa farms in the east. This has forced the Israeli army to keep a high number of professional units stationed in the area, as well as maintaining air-force readiness and anti-missile defences. Whether this localized conflict will escalate is now one of the primary questions for the region and the wider world.

Far from being a puppet of Tehran, Hezbollah must be understood as a powerful political party with a strong militia and a significant influence in several countries beyond its native Lebanon – Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Yemen. Its leadership and most of its rank-and-file consider themselves part of the transnational constellation that owes religious obedience to the Iranian Supreme Leader. But Hezbollah does not operate according to orders and fiats, and is itself a decision-maker in Iranian strategy in the Middle East. The final say on its policies comes from secretary general Hasan Nasrallah and his cadre. Their relation to Iran is that of partners, not auxiliaries.

Hamas, too, has a high degree of autonomy, and launched its attack based on its own political calculations rather those of Iran or Hezbollah. It decided that the policies pursued by the Israeli government and its settler population – indefinite occupation and gradual annexation – had reached a tipping point where inaction would prove fatal. This decision was rooted in a broader assessment of the geopolitical transformations taking place across the Middle East. Normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel was anticipated by the end of the year. A deal between Iran and the Americans was on the cards. The proposed India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor, which promises to reinforce the centrality of Gulf states to the global economy, was rapidly becoming a reality. In light of all of this, the ‘international community’ was poised to further marginalize the Palestinian cause and revive the PA as a pliable alternative to Hamas. Internal and external dynamics convinced the organization that it had to either act or accept a slow death.

It is almost certain that Hezbollah had no prior knowledge of the consequent attack. The Lebanese party agrees with Hamas on many issues, and has spent years assisting it with money, arms and tactical advice, yet their geopolitical positions are not always aligned (they were on opposite sides of the Syrian civil war, for example). It appears that Hamas’s act of desperation – to engineer a conflict with the aim of reactivating the Palestinian anticolonial struggle and maintaining their political relevance – will not have a straightforward domino effect on Hezbollah. At least not for the time being. By launching limited strikes across the border, Hezbollah is signalling its readiness to open a second front should the pulverization of Gaza reach a point that the party can no longer tolerate. Yet this restrained form of engagement also gives it the space to continually reassess the situation, consider its options and determine its next moves.

At present, the questions facing Nasrallah’s forces are these. Were they to enter a full-blown war with Israel (and possibly the US), would they be able to stop the Israeli invasion of Gaza and the massacre of tens of thousands of Palestinians? Would they risk decimating Lebanon and inflicting tremendous damage on Hezbollah’s support base? Would they lose thousands of fighters and most of their weapons? Would they jeopardize the accomplishments of the resistance axis in Syria, Iraq and Yemen? What would they stand to gain from this hazardous course of action? The answers are liable to change at any moment. The optimum strategy today might be defunct tomorrow. But as yet, it seems that this is Hamas’s war, not Hezbollah’s.

Hezbollah’s options – whether to maintain hostilities with Israel at their current level, escalate them or reduce them – are governed by three important variables. The first is the situation in Gaza. Israel wants to obliterate Hamas in toto, and has been given the green-light to commit genocide in pursuit of this goal, even though its chances of fulfilment are highly uncertain. If Hamas is able to drag out the fighting, inflict significant harm on the enemy and thwart an all-out Israeli victory, then Hezbollah will score major political points with minimal sacrifices, simply by keeping Israel distracted on its northern front. The party could thereby avoid the dangers of escalation and live to fight another war at a more propitious moment.

The second variable is Hezbollah’s power base in Lebanon, which, along with the majority of the Lebanese society, is supportive of the Palestinians but hesitant about a war with Israel. They know very well that, on top of having lost their savings in the 2019-20 Lebanese banking crisis, an Israeli assault would threaten their homes and what remains of their vital national infrastructure. Hezbollah is, understandably, reluctant to endanger and alienate this constituency. The final variable is Iran and its interests, including the diplomatic rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and the delicate negotiations with the Biden administration concerning its nuclear technology and the extent of US sanctions. The Iranian leadership knows that both of these would be upended by a major regional conflict – hence President Raisi’s cautious position and his continued lines of contact with the Saudi Crown Prince.

Yet as Israel’s killing machine mows down Palestinians by the thousands, each of these factors could change. If Hamas appears to be in existential danger, the calculus for Hezbollah may be different – since the loss of this ally could embolden Israel to target its Lebanese adversary next. As for the Lebanese people, it is unclear whether they will continue to prioritize their homes and assets amid the proliferating images of Palestinian body bags. Might they instead prove willing to suffer alongside the Palestinians? The Iranians, too, might have to look again at the balance between their immediate material interests and their nominal commitments to Palestinian liberation. Will they be able to sit face-to-face with US officials while the latter cheers on the immolation of Gaza? Wouldn’t this send the wrong signal to their other allies across the region – that Iranian support is fickle and unreliable?

If the situation in Gaza deteriorates to the point that Iran shelves its negotiations with the US, the Gulf states sour on Israel, and Hezbollah’s base becomes convinced that the party is not doing enough, then this could be a trigger for Hezbollah to escalate. Likewise, if Israel decides to target civilians in Lebanon and causes major casualties, Nasrallah cannot be expected to stand by. For Hezbollah, military intervention is always a political strategy rooted in the arithmetic of gains and losses and the complex field of allies and interests. Its next move will not be decided by Iranian influence or Islamist ideology, but by the demands of pragmatism.

(Courtesy: Sidecar, the blog of New Left Review. The New Left Review is a British bimonthly journal covering world politics, economy, and culture, which was established in 1960.)

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Decoding Nasrallah: Hezbollah’s Strategy on the Israel-Hamas War

Dario Sabaghi

The first speech by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah last Friday since the start of the war in Gaza between Hamas and Israel could be condensed into one phrase: “All options are on the table”.

But among the key takeaways of his speech, which lasted about one hour and twenty minutes, were useful indicators of Hezbollah’s strategy regarding its actions on the Israeli-Lebanese border and response to Israel’s ground invasion.

Nasrallah claimed that Hezbollah wasn’t involved in Hamas’ Operation al-Aqsa Flood but clarified that operations along the Israeli-Lebanese border are an expression of solidarity with Gaza, signalling that there won’t be an immediate full-scale involvement in the conflict.

Rather, Hezbollah’s operations are contingent on events in Gaza and the group will continually assess the level of escalation it will pursue on the Lebanese border against Israel.

“It was a careful and cautious articulated speech, but at the same time very powerful,” Imad Salamey, associate professor of Middle Eastern political affairs at the Lebanese American University, told The New Arab.

“Nasrallah managed high expectations for Hezbollah effectively by strategically delivering a well-orchestrated speech that kept the enemy in suspense about the party’s military plans, all without making unrealistic promises,” he said.

Joe Macaron, a global fellow with the Wilson Center’s Middle East Program, told TNA that the overall Hezbollah strategy outlined in Nasrallah’s speech matched the current engagement against Israel.

“The main messages were unsurprising. The primary focus is on Gaza, with southern Lebanon attempting to divert attention and alleviate pressure on it. The second message was a direct call to the United States to intensify pressure until it compels Israel to agree to a ceasefire,” he said.

Nasrallah’s strategy, as outlined in his speech, aims to make Israel “carefully calculate” its actions on Lebanon’s southern border and to influence Israel’s approach to military operations in Gaza.

Such a deterrent approach is tailored to Hezbollah’s current operations.

“They initially started to use anti-tank missiles to target the Israeli border and precision weapons to avoid civilian casualties. They primarily targeted the Shebaa Farms (a narrow disputed strip, now a military zone, at the Lebanese-Syrian border and Israeli-occupied Golan Heights),” Nicholas Blanford, an expert on Hezbollah and a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council, told TNA.

“However, they recently expanded their attacks to evacuated Israeli settlements near the border. This escalation might have been influenced by anticipation of Nasrallah’s speech, in which he hinted at readiness for further escalation. Hezbollah introduced new weapons, such as suicide drones, and the use of improvised rocket-assisted munitions (IRAMs), signalling a potential for deeper incursions into Israeli territory in the future, which already started to happen,” he said.

According to Elijah Magnier, a military analyst who has covered conflicts in the Middle East for more than 30 years, the military confrontations between Hezbollah and Israel cannot be defined as “skirmishes” for at least three reasons.

Firstly, both Hezbollah and Israel have suffered losses. Secondly, the exchange of fire is taking place all along the 120-km border for the first time, and, lastly, Hezbollah is fighting on a territory controlled by Israel, imposing the rhythm of the fighting.

“The battle of Gaza almost hasn’t started yet. So, we haven’t seen the potentiality of the Palestinian resistance against the occupational forces that are operating in Gaza. We’ve seen only a few attacks from Israelis who immediately withdrew to one kilometre on Jabalia’s front,” Magnier said.

“Therefore, there is no point for Hezbollah in anticipating and declaring war on Israel when the Palestinian groups are still very prepared for the Israeli invasion. The point is to wait for the result of the Israeli attack and how the Palestinians are going to behave.”

Assessing casualties on both sides is challenging. Hezbollah reports nearly 60 fighters have been killed, and they claim significant damage to Israel, including 120 Israeli soldiers killed or wounded, nine tanks and troop carriers destroyed, and equipment like cameras, radar, and communication systems damaged. TNA, however, couldn’t independently verify this information.

In his speech, Nasrallah stated that a third of the Israeli army is deployed near the border, along with naval and air forces. This information also lacks independent verification. As a precaution, civilians are evacuating, with Lebanese residents near Israel fleeing due to fears of potential conflict and Israeli civilians vacating from the northern Israeli border.

“Psychology is the major aspect here. The enemy has to be convinced that if he does certain things that you don’t want him to do, he is going to pay a very high price. And for that purpose, you have to make it credible to the enemy that you’re ready to inflict that price and sustain the response,” Heiko Wimmen, director of the International Crisis Group’s Iraq, Syria, Lebanon project, told The New Arab.

“To some extent, what Hezbollah has been doing for the past three weeks is to underline that they are ready to pay a price. But are they ready to pay the ultimate price? Nobody knows that because this is part of the constructive ambiguity mentioned by Nasrallah,” he said.

This constructive ambiguity aims not only to destabilise Israel psychologically but also to reaffirm the unsaid rule of engagement and deterrence that has been established on both sides over the years. This consists of not involving the loss of civilians in the conflict on the border, which has already occurred and could lead to a potential escalation, as well as trying to maintain a certain level of proportionality in attacks.

Wimmen explained that as the exchange of fire on the border intensifies, it creates a self-sustaining dynamic. Israel is pushing deeper to keep Hezbollah away from the border, and Hezbollah responds with strikes deeper into Israeli territory, amplifying the conflict.

This could be seen as a response to more intense Israeli attacks in Gaza, but dynamics in southern Lebanon also have their own logic.

“If the Israelis were to target civilians, especially more than they have thus far, there’s a possibility of returning to the pre-2000 logic of reciprocal civilian casualties, which carries a high potential for escalation. Hezbollah’s strategy remains unchanged, but the situation indicates an increased risk of escalation compared to what it was about ten days ago,” he said.

In the long-term, however, any escalation on the Israel-Lebanon border will likely be determined by the war on Gaza. Still, Magnier highlights that there are lots of misunderstandings about the expectations of Hezbollah’s involvement in the conflict.

“Hezbollah is in the battle, and it’s a controlled battle. So, it’s still within certain parameters because the war hasn’t really started yet in Gaza,” he said.

There are several factors that Israel has to take into consideration in order to avoid triggering a Hezbollah response that could result in an escalation. One consists of large-scale massacres of civilians in Gaza, which have already occurred.

In military terms, one of the most significant factors would be Hamas clearly losing the battle, while a third factor is the nature of any large-scale Israeli army incursion into Gaza and its consequences.

“I don’t see the Iranians sacrificing Hezbollah on the altar of Hamas. Hezbollah is much too important for them to want to fritter it away in a pointless full-scale war with Israel,” Blandford said.

Hezbollah is Tehran’s greatest export from the Islamic Revolution and a key component of Iran’s deterrence architecture. From its perspective, anyone thinking of attacking Iran, whether targeting their nuclear facilities or attempting to destabilise the regime, must take into account Hezbollah’s actions in Lebanon, the analyst added.

If a full-scale war were to develop, regardless of the outcome, Hezbollah would likely suffer significant losses, and there’s no guarantee it could rebuild as rapidly as it did after the 2006 war, impacting its role as a deterrent for Iran.

Hezbollah’s strategy may result in miscalculation in the event that Israel itself decides to escalate the conflict in Lebanon’s southern border, but all of the experts interviewed by TNA said that this scenario seems unlikely at the moment.

“I don’t see any of them suddenly initiating the overall war. But if escalation occurs against Hamas, you get more tension on the border, and this is where you get some miscalculation,” Macaron said.

Furthermore, a war in Lebanon would be disastrous for the population and counterproductive for Hezbollah, according to Michael Young, a political analyst and senior editor at the Carnegie Middle East Center.

“Israel might replicate in Lebanon, especially in Shia areas, what they did in Gaza, and there won’t be anyone to rebuild Lebanon. If they bomb the southern suburbs of Beirut and the Shia villages in southern Lebanon as they’re doing in Gaza today, it’ll place a heavy burden on Hezbollah as hundreds of thousands of Shia residents would be displaced,” Young said.

“This could lead to strong reactions against Hezbollah, not only from other communities but also from the Shia community. Engaging in a war is not an option Hezbollah desires as it could transform the Lebanese landscape to their disadvantage.”

But in terms of regional politics, the current involvement of Hezbollah may have some advantages for the group.

“The past years have seen tensions and conflicts between Shia and Sunnis in various regions, including Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Presenting Hezbollah as a champion for Sunni Palestinians, whether in Lebanon, Gaza, or the West Bank, could help mend sectarian divisions,” Salamey said.

“Hezbollah’s image suffered due to its involvement in the Syrian war, supporting Shia groups against Sunni factions. Nevertheless, this conflict could serve as an opportunity to restore Hezbollah’s reputation as liberators of Palestine.”

Hezbollah’s controlled involvement in the conflict also serves Iran’s aim to consolidate and strengthen the use of the regional alliance, known as the ‘Axis of Resistance’, to counterbalance Israel and the United States.

“Hezbollah’s role in this alliance of forces is central in terms of reinforcing relations between the different groups in the axis of resistance. And basically, now Iran has a major weapon with which to defend its interest in the region,” Young said.

(Dario Sabaghi is a freelance journalist interested in human rights. Courtesy: The New Arab, a pan-Arab news website headquartered in London.)